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THE EXISTENCE OF THE PAST 
Joseph Diekemper 
Abstract 
 My goal in this paper is to address what I call the ‘Incoherence’ objection to the growing universe 
theory of time.   At the root of the objection is the thought that one cannot wed objective temporal 
becoming with the existence of a tenseless past—which is apparently what the growing universe 
theorist tries to do.  To do so, however, is to attribute both dynamic and static aspects to time, and, 
given the mutual exclusivity of these two aspects—so the thought goes—incoherence results.   My 
solution to the problem is to offer an alternative account of past existence that is compatible with a 
dynamic conception of time.  I take as my starting point Adams’ suggestion that the past exists in virtue 
of the existence of thisnesses of past individuals.  I first seek to defend this suggestion, before 
amending it in order to provide a satisfactory response to the Incoherence objection.  The result is a 
new growing universe theory which avoids the Incoherence objection but which has some surprising 
features of its own.  Chief among these is the rejection of present events.  I argue, however, that such a 
rejection is a necessary consequence of endorsing the growing universe theory, and that it is not as 
counter-intuitive as it initially sounds. 
 
Introduction 
In the debate between A-Theorists and B-Theorists in the philosophy of time, it is often 
argued (and sometimes taken for granted) that the only viable alternative to the static, 
eternalist B-Theory is the version of the A-Theory known as presentism.  Presentism is the 
view, roughly, that the only things that exist (simpliciter) are present things.  Thus, the presentist 
believes that past and future things are equally non-existent (just as the B-Theorist believes that past 
and future things are equally existent).  I have argued elsewhere that the presentist, given this 
doctrine of ontological symmetry, must reconcile her theory with the intuition that the past is 
fixed and the future is not, and that she is unable to do so.  For the A-Theorist, there must be 
 2 
some feature of time that can account for a robust asymmetry of fixity—not to mention the 
other temporal asymmetries—and the presentist is unable to provide us with one.  Only an 
ontological asymmetry can play this role, given an A-Theoretic framework.
1
   
 On the basis of these concerns, I concluded in the earlier article that presentism fails.  
I also suggested a feature of time that can account for the asymmetries; namely, temporal 
becoming, where that notion is conceived in the following way: events become real in the 
present and remain real thereafter.  This conception of temporal becoming, I suggested, 
provides us with the immediate ground for the asymmetry of fixity: the past is different from 
the future because the past exists and the future does not.  So, contra the presentist, the 
difference between past and future is an ontological one, and this difference, based as it is on 
a non-presentist conception of temporal becoming, fundamentally constitutes temporal 
asymmetry.  I will take these prior conclusions as my starting assumptions here, and I will 
call their conjunction the growing universe theory of time.
2
  Why is it often thought that the 
growing universe theory is not a viable alternative to presentism?  It is because of a powerful 
objection to the theory which I call the ‘Incoherence’ objection.  It is my purpose in this 
paper is to consider this objection, and to formulate a version of the growing universe theory 
that successfully avoids it.
3
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 See Diekemper (2005).   
2
 I prefer this label to the more standard ‘growing block’ label, since the latter implies a four dimensionalist 
theory of time and persistence, and I wish to avoid this implication. 
3
 Given that I am interested in defending a version of the A-Theory of time against a rival A-Theory, I will not 
be considering B-Theoretic objections.  For my purposes here, I take the A-Theory of time to denote a dynamic 
conception of time according to which temporal becoming (however conceived) and tense are objective features 
of reality.  I take the B-Theory to denote a static conception of time according to which there is no objective 
temporal becoming, and according to which past, present, and future events all exist tenselessly.  In stipulating 
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1. The Incoherence objection 
1.1  
At the root of the Incoherence objection is the thought that one cannot wed objective 
temporal becoming with the existence of a tenseless past—which is apparently what the 
growing universe theorist does.  To do so is to attribute both dynamic and static aspects to 
time, and, given the mutual exclusivity of these two aspects—so the thought goes—
incoherence results.  Merricks (2006), for example, articulates the Incoherence objection by 
having us consider Nero sitting in the past watching a gladiator bout, and thinking to himself, 
‘I am sitting here at the present time’.  Now, given that the event of Nero’s thought is fixed in 
the past, it can never change.  This seems to imply that Nero is now and forevermore thinking 
false thoughts (because he’s not presently sitting there).  Of course, the thought is not false 
when he actually thinks it—that is, when he thinks it in, say, AD 60, it’s not false.  But if the 
event of Nero thinking, ‘I am sitting here at the present time,’ still exists (as the growing 
universe theorist apparently says it does), then Nero is still thinking the thought.  He is 
thinking it at AD 60, and when AD 60 was present, it was true; but since AD 60 is no longer 
present, Nero’s thoughts have changed in truth value, even though there is not supposed to 
have been any intrinsic change in the event of which his thought is a constituent (in virtue of 
the fixity of the past). 
 Now the growing universe theorist may wish to avoid this objection by claiming that 
the change in the truth value of a past belief does not constitute an intrinsic change in the 
event of which the belief is a constituent.  Unfortunately, however, the objection goes deeper 
than this response acknowledges.  The point of the Incoherence objection is that the 
truthmaker for Nero’s belief, i.e. Nero’s presently sitting, is no longer present.  So apparently 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
these definitions, I am drawing the distinction between the A- and B-Theories rather coarsely, but my argument 
does not require a more fine grained distinction. 
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the growing universe theorist must claim that Nero is presently believing his belief, even 
though his presently sitting is not present; and of course this is incoherent, unless we deny 
that Nero is presently believing ‘I am sitting here at the present time,’ (perhaps he is pastly 
believing it).  This, however, would amount to an intrinsic change in the event.  In order for 
Nero’s belief, ‘I am sitting here at the present time,’ to be true (according to the A-Theorist), 
presentness must be a constituent of the event of Nero’s believing it; but if the event is past, 
presentness cannot be a constituent of it.  So the worry is that, on the growing universe 
theory, past events are intrinsically present.   
 The B-theorist avoids this worry because, for her, the ‘present’ does not pick out any 
objective feature of reality, it merely functions as an indexical (like ‘here’ or ‘I’).  The 
presentist avoids the worry because, although ‘the present’ is an objective feature of reality, 
all that reality is composed of is present objects and events (that is, Nero is not presently 
watching a gladiator bout in AD 60, thinking ‘I am sitting here at the present time’).  The 
growing universe theorist, however, acknowledges the objectivity of the present (because 
hers is a dynamic theory), but claims that events continue to exist after they have occurred in 
the present.   
I will have more to say about the nature and source of the Incoherence objection in 
Section 2.1; but I do want to make two further points explicit here.  First, I take it that 
Merricks’ objection concerns a metaphysical problem with the growing universe theory, not 
an epistemological one; and I, too, will be concerned with the metaphysical problem.  
Secondly, given the assumptions which I stated in the Introduction, I will not be considering 
Fine’s (2006) solution to what is, no doubt, a related problem.  Fine identifies four theses 
concerning the configuration of temporal reality, which he traces ‘loosely’ back to 
McTaggart’s (1908) argument for the unreality of time.  They are Realism (i.e. tense is real); 
Neutrality (i.e. no time is ontologically privileged); Absolutism (i.e. reality is not relative to a 
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time); and Coherence (i.e. reality is not contradictory) (Fine, 2006: 400).  Given that these 
four theses cannot all be true, one of them must be jettisoned: the eternalist rejects Realism 
and the presentist rejects Neutrality, but given certain problems with presentism which Fine 
identifies, he argues that the tensed realist would be better off rejecting either Absolutism or 
Coherence, rather than Neutrality.  What I want to be explicit about here is that just as the 
presentist cannot retain Neutrality, nor can the growing universe theorist.  Neutrality cannot 
allow for a non-existent future, since it cannot allow that non-future times are ontologically 
privileged, which they clearly are if non-future times exist and future ones do not.  Given 
this, there is little motivation to consider what Fine acknowledges are the ‘nonstandard’ 
rejections of either Absolutism or Coherence.
4
  Nonetheless, since the growing universe 
theory is a hybrid theory (hybrid, that is, between presentism and eternalism), merely giving 
up Neutrality will not suffice to preserve Coherence, and this means that the onus is upon the 
proponent of such a theory to offer an account of past existence which neither contradicts nor 
compromises her dynamic conception of temporal reality.
5
  Fortunately, however, the 
growing universe theorist can provide such an account.   
1.2 The makings of a response  
I take my cue here from Robert Adams’ (1986) suggestion about the existence of the 
thisnesses of past individuals, where a thisness of an individual x is the property of being x, or 
the property of being identical to x.  What Adams has in mind here is primitive, non-
qualitative thisness; that is to say, an individual x’s thisness is not merely a conjunction of all 
of x’s qualitative properties.  What is a qualitative property?  According to Adams,  
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 As a matter of fact, as we will see in Section 2.1, Adams’ rejection of both Neutrality and Absolutism yields 
incoherence. 
5
 So although the Incoherence objection may be related to McTaggart’s paradox, more work is required in 
solving it than just giving up one of Fine’s four inconsistent theses. 
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 a property is purely qualitative—a suchness—if and only if it could be expressed, in a language 
sufficiently rich, without the aid of such referential devices as proper names, proper adjectives and 
verbs (such as ‘Leibnizian’ and ‘pegasizes’), indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite 
descriptions. (Adams 1979) 
Examples, however, are the best way to make the distinction between qualitative and non-
qualitative properties: living in a large city and being the son of a carpenter are examples of 
qualitative properties; while living in New York and being the son of Henry are examples of 
non-qualitative properties.   
 So Adams’ view is that thisnesses are not conjunctions of qualitative properties, but 
are primitive and non-qualitative.  This is the Scotistic notion of thisness—after Duns Scotus 
who coined the term ‘haecceitas,’ of which ‘thisness’ is a translation—and stands in 
opposition to the Leibnizian conception of thisness; since Leibniz thought that an individual’s 
thisness was merely the conjunction of all of its qualitative properties.  Furthermore, by 
‘individual’, Adams intends any kind of entity which is capable of instantiating properties, 
e.g., material objects, persons, events, times, etc. (it is another question, of course, whether all 
of these kinds of entities have thisness—I will touch on this below).  Based on this 
conception of thisness, Adams argues i) that there are thisnesses for at least some kinds of 
individuals (Adams, op.cit.), ii) that there are, however, no thisnesses of non-actual 
individuals (Adams 1981), also iii) that there are no thisnesses of individuals that will exist, 
but that do not exist yet, and finally iv) that there are thisnesses of individuals that have 
existed but no longer exist (Adams 1986).   Call the conjunction of iii) and iv) Adams’ Time 
and Thisness Thesis (TTT).  I take TTT to offer an attractive picture of how it is that the past 
exists while the future does not.  Unfortunately for the present discussion, however, Adams 
does not spell out how such a picture provides a means of escape from the Incoherence 
objection to the growing universe theory of time.  Of course, this really is not a criticism for 
him, since he is more concerned with offering an account of reference that reflects his 
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temporally asymmetric ontology, than he is with defending and explicating that ontology.  
But it would be a criticism of my project if I left the issue unaddressed, so I will need to 
complete the picture in what follows.   
The basic picture that I will begin with is that the existence of the past is manifested 
in the existence of the thisnesses of past individuals.  I will attempt to spell out what this 
manifestation amounts to in Section 2, below; but first, what kind of past individuals should 
we identify as playing this role?  Adams does not take a view here.  Keller (2004) is one 
commentator who interprets Adams’ TTT as a claim about the thisnesses of the constituents 
of past events (e.g., persons, material objects, and even properties) and argues persuasively 
that such an account faces unpalatable difficulties; furthermore, on my view of time, the 
fundamental temporal entities are events themselves, not their constituents.  For these 
reasons, the picture I develop here has it that the past exists in the form of the thisnesses of 
past events.  This is not to arbitrarily claim that only events have thisness.  For my purposes 
here, I can allow that many different kinds of entity instantiate thisness.
6
  It is just to claim 
that past existence is manifested not in the existence of the thisnesses of the constituents of 
events, but in the existence of the thisnesses of events themselves.  Again, this position is 
grounded in my temporal ontology, which takes events to be the fundamental terms of 
temporal relations (while material objects are the fundamental terms of spatial relations). 
I think it is important at this point to deal with some initial concerns regarding the 
basic picture, and this is what I will do for the remainder of this section, primarily by 
focusing on Adams’ TTT.  This process will lead to the amendment of TTT, and in Section 2 
I will return to the Incoherence objection and state how the amended picture can answer the 
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 I am, however, largely sympathetic with the arguments against material objects having thisness (see 
Diekemper (2009)). 
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objection.  The answer will, in turn, lead to some surprising results, and these will require 
further defense before concluding the paper.   
1.3 Initial worries dealt with 
Probably the most important initial worry to deal with is to justify the claims that there are 
such properties as thisnesses, and that events have them.  Contemporary metaphysicians are 
understandably skeptical of such entities as thisness, and this is why I have devoted an entire 
paper to defending these claims.
7
  I will not recapitulate the arguments of that paper here, but 
I will say something brief about the intuitive plausibility of the claim that events have 
thisness.  I take this claim to amount to no more than the claim that there is something that it 
is to be a particular event, and that claim is indeed intuitively plausible.  Take, for example, 
the event of the Battle of Waterloo: the claim I have defended in (2009) and am assuming 
here is, simply, that if the Battle of Waterloo exists, then there is something that it is to be 
that particular battle.  It will, perhaps, assist the reader in working through the arguments that 
follow if she bears in mind this intuitive construal of the claim that events have thisness.  
Now to deal more circumspectly with some other initial concerns. 
1.3.1 Why think the thisnesses of past events still exist? 
Suppose one acknowledges that events do have thisness.  Why would one think that an 
event’s thisness would continue to exist even though the event in question is no longer 
occurring?  Adams (1986) provides an intuitive argument, based on temporal asymmetry and 
ontological dependence, in dealing with this question.  Although the argument, by Adams’ 
own admission, is far from conclusive, it has particular appeal for someone who thinks the 
past exists and the future does not.  He begins by arguing that the thisnesses of future 
individuals do not exist.  This is because, inasmuch as the thisness x
*
 of an individual x 
depends for its existence upon x, it would be counter-intuitive to suggest that x
*
could exist 
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 See Diekemper (2009). 
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prior to the existence of x itself.  For, suppose that x comes into existence at t, and that x
*
 
exists prior to t: then prior to t an entity would exist that depends for its existence on an entity 
that has not yet come into existence; in which case, x could not fail to come into existence at 
t.  But if we think the future is maximally open and undetermined, then we would want to 
claim that x might not come into existence at t, even if we hold fixed all that existed prior to t; 
and this is not a live option if x
*
already exists.   
 Now, all this purports to show is that the thisnesses of future individuals do not exist.  
What of those of past individuals?  Could not the objector use the past directed analogue of 
the above future directed argument to claim that the thisnesses of past individuals do not 
exist?  According to Adams, no, because, intuitively, the past is not maximally open.  Thus, 
supposing that x is a past individual, we can allow the present existence of x’s thisness x*, 
even though doing so necessitates that x exists at some time; since it is (now) necessary that x 
did exist (i.e. x’s having existed is temporally necessary in virtue of x being past).  Given, 
then, a maximally open future and a closed past, and given the ontological dependence of 
thisnesses upon the individuals that instantiate them, we should affirm the existence of 
thisnesses of past individuals.    
 So if the objector wishes to deny the existence of the thisnesses of past individuals, 
she cannot use the same argument that Adams uses to deny the existence of the thisnesses of 
future individuals.  Is there some other argument that she could use?  Adams does not 
consider this, but one possibility is that thisnesses might be like Aristotelian universals, 
inasmuch as they cannot exist uninstantiated.  On this view, when a past individual ceases to 
exist, so does its thisness.  But it is not at all clear to me that this should be the case.  For one 
thing, it is not clear that this is what the Aristotelian has in mind in espousing her view.  It is 
one thing to claim that there are no universals corresponding to properties that are never 
instantiated; it is another to claim that when the last particular instantiating some property 
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ceases to exist, so does the property (universal) itself.  And it is the latter claim that is 
required for the objection to go through.
8
  More importantly, we cannot lose sight of the fact 
that though thisnesses are properties, they are not universals (given that they are uniquely 
instantiated).  Again, take the Battle of Waterloo.  As we saw, above, to say that the Battle of 
Waterloo has thisness, is to say that there is something that there is to be that particular battle.  
It strikes me that if there were something that it is to be the Battle of Waterloo while that 
battle was occurring, then, intuitively, there remains something that it is to be the Battle of 
Waterloo, even though the Battle is no longer occurring.   
 These intuitive musings at least provide a presumption in favor of the continued 
existence of the thisnesses of past individuals.  I think that what the musings have shown is 
that if one believes that the past exists, then this presumption is particularly plausible.   
1.3.2 Why think that the existence of the thisnesses of past events implies that the past exists? 
So the thisnesses of past individuals exist and those of future individuals do not, and it is 
clear that Adams takes this to imply that the past is real and that the future is not.  But, though 
we have just seen that the present existence of past thisnesses is highly plausible if the past is 
real, does the former imply the latter?   The presentist would surely want to object to this 
alleged implication, particularly if she accepted the present existence of past thisnesses.  How 
might she do so?  Before speculating on  behalf of the presentist, I should first note a 
difficulty in comparing and contrasting Adams’ existential claims with those of the presentist.  
Adams is explicit that his ontological commitment to past entities is to be expressed in terms 
of the primitive two-place propositional function ‘x exists at (a time) t’, primitive because it 
cannot be reduced to the one place propositional function ‘x exists’ (which Adams takes to be 
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 Armstrong (1999: 198), who has an Aristotelian theory of universals, endorses what he characterizes as a 
‘relatively liberal form’ of the ‘Principle of Instantiation,’ according to which the principle ranges over all times.  
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equivalent to ‘ y)(y=x)’) (ibid.: 321).  Even though Adams endorses an analogous reduction 
in the modal case (whereby ‘x exists in a world w’ is reduced to ‘x exists’), he rejects such a 
reduction in the temporal case, since he thinks that ‘our quantifiers should be understood as 
ranging, at least, over past a well as present things’ (ibid.: 322).  So Adams acknowledges 
that he is using a different existential quantifier, in expressing ontological commitments to 
temporal entities, than both the eternalist and the presentist do.  The eternalist and the 
presentist both express their ontological commitments to temporal entities in terms of the 
maximally unrestricted quantifier phrase, ‘x exists’; that is, in terms of existence simpliciter.  
They simply disagree about what falls within the range of the quantifier.  The eternalist thinks 
that all temporal entities—past, present, and future—tenselessly exist, the presentist thinks 
that only present entities exist (that is, these are the only temporal entities that there are); but 
they both agree that whatever exists, exists simpliciter. Adams, however, thinks that his 
ontology requires him to restrict the quantifier to specific times.  Given this difference 
between the presentist’s and Adams’ use of the existential quantifier, it makes it difficult to 
adequately capture the disagreement between the two, but in the hypothetical debate that 
follows, I will endeavor to do so.   
 At one point in his argument, Adams (1986: 320) acknowledges that in order to affirm 
the existence of past thisnesses, he must deny that the thisnesses of individuals have the 
individuals themselves as essential constituents.  Let us call the claim that individuals are 
essential constituents of their thisnesses the Essential Constituents Claim (ECC).  As I 
understand Adams, his point is that if ECC were true, then the thisnesses of individuals could 
not exist without the individuals themselves simultaneously existing; and he does not want to 
say that past individuals such as the Battle of Waterloo exist presently (they exist at past 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
According to this form of the principle, every universal must be instantiated at some time, but not necessarily at 
the present time. 
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times), even though he does wish to say that that Battle’s thisness exists presently.9  In view 
of this, the presentist who wished to affirm the existence of the thisnesses of past individuals, 
while denying the existence of those individuals themselves, should certainly endorse 
Adams’ denial of ECC.  So, it is open to the presentist to pose the following question: if ECC 
is false, then what motivation is there to infer from the present existence of past thisnesses the 
existence of the past?
10
   
To see the force of this objection, suppose an instantaneous past event e, having 
thisness e*, occurred at t0.  Suppose, further, that it is presently t1.  Adams, I take it, would 
claim that though e does not exist at t1 (i.e. presently), its past existence at t0 can presently be 
affirmed on the basis of e*’s existence at t0 and at all times after t0 (including t1).  Our 
presentist objector would claim that e*’s existence simpliciter (i.e. at t1) gives us no ground 
for positing the existence of e, other than when e was present.  So at all times after t0, the 
most we can say about e’s existence is that it obtained when t0 was present but not that it 
obtains in the past.  The question now is, independently of one’s belief about the existence of 
the past, which of these inferences from the agreed present existence of e* is more plausible?  
In light of Adams’ denial of ECC, the presentist could argue that it is more plausible, at t1, to 
infer the non-existence simpliciter of e rather than the (restricted) past existence of e at t0.  
This is because they both agree on the following three premises: a) e does not currently exist 
at t1 (though the presentist would say ‘e does not exist simpliciter’), b) e* does exist at t1 
(again, the presentist would say ‘e* exists simpliciter’), and c) e is not an essential constituent 
of e*; so what further premise would Adams offer for e’s existence at t0? 
                                                          
9
 I take it that ECC would require either that past individuals exist in the present, or that the thisnesses of past 
individuals do not exist in the present; and, as we have seen, Adams rejects both of these claims. 
10Again, there is a difficulty here in reconciling Adams’ quantifier with the presentist’s.  I will make this explicit 
below; but I should emphasize that presently I am simply trying to give my interpretation of Adams’ TTT a run 
for its money.  I will be developing my own view (distinct from Adams’, but indebted to it) in Section 2. 
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In Adams’ defense, I think there is a further premise he could make use of (though he 
does not explicitly use it in this way).  It is a premise that comes in the context of his 
objection to the presentist ontology.  He claims that the ontological basis of ‘the fact that an 
important battle was fought at Waterloo on June 18, 1815 … is, or includes, something that 
was a battle and that does not exist now and is not occurring now’ (ibid.: 322).  Adams grants 
that this claim rests on intuitions, but they are not intuitions specifically about whether or not 
the past exists, so this is not a question begging response; they are intuitions about what must 
be part of the world’s ontology in order for a fact or state of affairs to obtain—and also, I take 
it, in order for the thisness of an event to exist.  According to Adams, the Battle of Waterloo 
does not exist presently, but its thisness does, and therefore it would appear that ECC is false.  
But, unless you are a presentist, the present non-existence of an entity does not rule out the 
existence of that entity at a past time; and, Adams would say, if you agree with the presentist 
that it does, then you owe some account of how a fact about a past event or the thisness of 
that event can exist without anything in the world (present or otherwise) to ground it.  
Does the requirement for an ontological basis conflict with Adams’ denial of ECC?  I 
think not, because it seems that e can be the ontological basis of e* without being an essential 
constituent of it.  To judge definitively whether this is the case would require an analysis of 
the notion of essential constituent (as well as ontological ground), something which Adams 
does not provide and which I will not attempt here.  Intuitively, however, it is plausible to 
maintain that essential constituency is a relation governed by the following conditional: if x is 
an essential constituent of y, then if y exists now, x must exist now.  But, prima facie, is there 
any such simultaneous existence requirement for x’s being the ontological basis of y?  Why 
would one hold that in order for x to be the ontological basis of y, both x and y must exist 
simultaneously?  Consider the example of Aristotelian universals again (see above, Section 
1.3.1), and suppose that such a universal comes into existence when it is first instantiated, and 
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continues to exist even after the demise of that instantiation.
11
  Here the universal’s 
ontological basis is the instantiation that no longer coexists with it.  So, while the presentist 
might try to argue that the requirement for an ontological basis conflicts with Adams’ denial 
of ECC, I am hard pressed to see that such an argument would go beyond a brute appeal to a 
presentist ontology.   
2 Amending the Response 
2.1 The Incoherence objection dispelled 
So where does the foregoing leave our account of past existence?  Have we filled out the 
proposal enough for it to satisfactorily answer the Incoherence objection?  My interpretation 
of Adams’ TTT had it that the past exists and provides the ontological basis for the present 
existence of the thisnesses of past events.  This, however, is not quite satisfactory; for if the 
claim is that the thisnesses of past events exist presently, and past events themselves exist in 
the past, then it seems that we still fall foul of the Incoherence objection.  This is because, on 
the standard interpretation, what it is for an event to exist is simply for it to occur at some 
time t.  I say ‘standard’, because philosophers of time of all persuasions use these locutions 
interchangeably.  Of course, the precise locutions will vary according to whether one is an 
eternalist, a presentist, or a growing universe theorist.  For example, the eternalist 
characterizes an event’s existence in the following way: 
 (EE)  An event e exists simpliciter just in case e occurs (tenseless) at some 
time t.   
The presentist, on the other hand, characterizes an event’s existence this way: 
  (PE)  An event e exists simpliciter just in case e is occurring (present tense).   
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 Another possibility here—one that conforms to Armstrong’s version of the principle of instantiation (see n. 8, 
above)—would be to posit a universal which exists at all times, but which depends for its existence on being 
instantiated during some finite temporal period.   
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And Adams, our representative growing universe theorist, claims  
  (GUE)  An event e exists at a time t just in case e is occurring (present tense) 
or has occurred (past tense) at t.   
Furthermore, as we saw, Adams claims that, with respect to temporal entities, ‘exists at t’ is a 
basic notion that cannot be reduced to ‘exists simpliciter’.   
 Now, these observations bring into relief the nature of the Incoherence objection: the 
growing universe theorist, in acknowledging that events exist at times other than the present, 
must allow that these events exist tenselessly.  To see this, recall that Adams’ claim is that the 
correct quantifier phrase for past entities is x exists at t, not x existed at t; and clearly x exists 
at t must be a tenseless locution here, and not a present tensed one, given that he was 
quantifying over past events when he made the claim (ibid.: 321).
12
  So, according to this 
analysis, the growing universe theorist, as represented by Adams, holds that an event exists 
(tenseless) at a time t just in case it is occurring (present tense), or has occurred (past tense), 
at t—and this is, indeed, straightforwardly incoherent.  An event e cannot both exist 
(tenseless) at a time t AND be occurring or have occurred at t.  In this context, ‘exists at t’ 
and ‘occurs at t’ express the same relation, and that relation must therefore either be a 
tenseless one or a tensed one, but cannot be both.  Further, if the growing universe theorist 
were to attempt to avoid this allegation by claiming that a past event both exists (tenseless) at 
t and occurs (tenseless) at t, then, once again, we lose temporal becoming and thus the 
dynamic aspect of time (since this characterization of an event’s existence is equivalent to 
EE, above).   In view of all of this, a further adjustment is required to Adams’ TTT in order to 
avoid the Incoherence objection, and that adjustment depends upon rejecting Adams’ claim 
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 Tooley is one growing universe theorist who is explicit that past existence is tenseless; even though he, like 
Adams, maintains that existence at a time is a primitive notion.  See Tooley (1997, Chs. 5-6). 
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that ‘exists at t’ cannot be reduced to ‘exists simpliciter’, since it was this claim that led to the 
incoherence.
13
    
 The adjustment I have in mind will result in a substantially different theory than that 
proposed by Adams, so although my explication of his views in Section 1 was also a partial 
defense, from this point forward my views will begin to diverge from his.  The first step in 
amending Adams’ theory is to characterize past existence as existence simpliciter, rather than 
as Adams’ existence at a time, but we will define that existence in terms of occurrence at a 
time (just as the eternalist and presentist do).  The reason for this, again, is to avoid the 
contradictory claim that events exist tenselessly at t while also bearing a tensed relation (that 
of occurrence) to t.  Instead, we will claim that because events exist simpliciter, and not at a 
time, there is no incoherence in their tensed occurrence at a time; indeed, events exist 
simpliciter in virtue of  their tensed occurrence at a time.  There are, however, two immediate 
issues that attend this move and must be addressed.  The first is that we must now consider all 
events as being ontologically on a par, given that all events exist simpliciter.  Again, this is 
precisely what both the eternalist and the presentist maintain: they both hold that all events 
have the same ontological status (but they disagree about which events exist).  But the 
growing universe theorist, on the standard view, holds that some events exist presently while 
others exist in the past; in which case, neither type of event exists simpliciter.  As we saw, 
this was precisely why Adams was driven to deny that ‘x exists at t’ could be reduced to ‘x 
exists’.  There is a way forward, however, for the growing universe theorist, and it is to claim 
that the only events that exist (simpliciter) are past events.  This claim will no doubt strike the 
reader as deeply counterintuitive; but I will argue in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 that it is both 
motivated and plausible.   
                                                          
13
 Thus we see, speaking in Fine’s terms (see Section 1.1), that rejecting both Neutrality and Absolutism (i.e. 
existence simpliciter) does not dispel the incoherence. 
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 The second issue follows on from the first.  Recall that for the eternalist existence 
simpliciter is tenseless existence (past, present, and future events all exist tenselessly); 
whereas for the presentist, existence simpliciter is present tensed (all events exist presently).  
What, then, should the growing universe theorist say about the status, with respect to tense, of 
existence simpliciter?  If past events exist simpliciter, then they can neither exist presently, 
nor can they exist at a past time, and therefore it appears that they must exist tenselessly; but 
does this not just raise the specter of incoherence again?  I think not.  The earlier incoherence 
resulted from the claim that events exist tenselessly at a time, but the revised claim is that 
they exist simpliciter in virtue of having occurred at a past time, and there is no obvious 
incoherence in this claim.  Here, then, is the amended characterization of an event’s 
existence, reflecting the existence simpliciter of past events: 
  (GUE’)  An event e exists simpliciter just in case e has occurred at t. 
So, even though the existence simpliciter here must be interpreted as tenseless existence, it 
does not contradict the claim that e occurred at t, since e does not exist (tenseless) at t (it 
exists (tenseless) simpliciter).  In light of GUE’, what should we say now about Nero and his 
thought about the present?  The reality of the past, on this view, does not entail that events 
occur (tenselessly) in the past.  So the event of Nero watching a gladiator bout and thinking 
about the present is not tenselessly occurring at the spatiotemporal location of Rome, AD 60.  
Nero’s thinking about the present is not occurring at any time, rather, his thinking about the 
present has occurred, and exists simpliciter.   
 What of Adams’ time and thisness thesis (TTT)?  Well, we may still wish to ask what 
it is for an event which has occurred to exist simpliciter.  It is one thing to define an event’s 
existence in such a way, it is quite another to explain how such existence is possible.  What 
kinds of things are these events which exist but are no longer occurring?  Some, in fact, 
would claim that this characterization of events involves a category mistake: events are 
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occurrents, not existents, it is things (substances) which exist.  And even supposing that there 
is no category mistake, what ontological grounds do we have for claiming that past events 
exist, if their existence is grounded in their having occurred?  I think an amended version of 
Adams’ TTT can help us make sense of these issues.  Though the original TTT (see Section 
1.2, above) was a general account of any individual’s thisness and its relation to time, 
consider the following version, which is specific to an event’s thisness, and which reflects the 
conclusions of this section: 
  (TTT’): The thisness e* of an event e exists simpliciter just in case e has 
occurred at t.  
Notice how similar the structure of this thesis is to GUE’.  I think there is scope here to relate 
an event to its thisness in such a way that we can legitimately and helpfully characterize an 
event’s existence simpliciter in terms of the existence simpliciter of its thisness.  This I will 
attempt to do in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Present events and the argument from ontic determinacy 
I argued above that the growing universe theorist can avoid the Incoherence objection if she 
is willing to reject the existence of present events.  My goal in this sub-section is to argue for 
that rejection independently of a solution to the Incoherence objection (though not 
independently of the growing universe theory).  As we have seen, the presentist stipulates that 
present existence is existence simpliciter.  This stipulation is supposed to be highly intuitive, 
since we experience the present directly, and nothing could be more real than the objects of 
direct experience.  But the present is notoriously vague and indeterminate, since what is 
happening presently has yet to fully occur.  How do we designate the present moment?  It 
seems the only way to do so is by ostension, but no sooner do we utter, ‘This is the present 
moment’, than the token of that utterance becomes false.  Consider, further, that if the past is 
real, and the future is not, then so called present events have temporal parts which lack a 
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concrete reality; since they have not yet come into existence.  But this idea, that there exist 
concrete events with non-existent parts, hardly seems coherent.  If it is not coherent, then 
what does this incoherence tell us about the existential status of present events? 
These considerations point towards what I call the argument from ontic determinacy.  
The argument plays a pivotal role in the response to the Incoherence objection, since it has 
ontological ramifications that clearly distinguish that response from the presentist’s account 
of past existence, but which also yield a version of the growing universe theory which is 
immune to the Incoherence objection.  We will first take a look at the argument, then 
consider its ramifications for the growing universe theory, before moving on to deal with any 
intuitive worries it might engender.  The first step in the argument is to note the semantic 
difficulty of designating ‘the present’.  Of course, if we think of ‘the present’ in terms of ‘the 
present century’, or ‘the present year’, or ‘the present day’, then there is no great difficulty 
here.  The difficulty, however, arises when we attempt to designate the present moment—the 
instant at which all earlier times are past, and all later times are future.  Given the dynamic 
nature of time, the present moment is constantly changing (by becoming past), and thus any 
event that occurs at that moment cannot be designated until it is past.   
Why should we feel motivated to limit the scope of the present so narrowly?  Perhaps 
if one were a presentist or an eternalist one would not feel so motivated, but the growing 
universe theorist can hardly allow the present to be designated by intervals of centuries, 
years, or days; since, by her lights, the end of the present day (and so a fortiori the present 
year or present century) is still future and therefore does not yet exist.  The reason that the 
presentist and the eternalist need not share this motivation is that, on their respective views, 
there is no time t at which all events earlier than t exist, and all events later than t do not exist.  
According to eternalism, all events earlier and later than t exist, and so the question of a 
temporal region or boundary between existence and non-existence does not even arise.  
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According to presentism, no events earlier or later than the present time exist, and here, of 
course, there is the issue of a temporal distinction between existence and non-existence; but 
need this distinction involve a sharp, instantaneous cut-off at the ‘edge of becoming,’ as in 
the case of the growing universe theory?  Arguably not.  Assuming that presentism requires 
that at least some present events are non-instantaneous, then such events must be wholly 
located in the present, and this entails that the present itself is a temporally extended region, 
rather than a point-like boundary.  Thus, for the presentist, there is a period t0-t1 (i.e. the 
present period) such that all events earlier and later than that period do not exist.  How this 
period is defined is not clear to me, but, unless all events are instantaneous, it cannot be 
characterized as an instantaneous boundary.  So it is only on the growing universe theory, 
given its asymmetric ontology, that there must be a sharp cut-off between that which exists 
and that which does not. 
This point leads to the second step in the argument from ontic determinacy—one 
which relies upon the asymmetric ontology just noted.  Again, given that ontology, at any 
present moment of time t events having occurred earlier than t exist, while those that will 
occur later than t do not exist.  Now, a non-instantaneous event e that occurs at t, where t is 
present, can only bear one of three possible relations to t:  either 1) t is the last moment of e’s 
existence (i.e. e has just finished occurring at t), or 2) t is the first moment of e’s existence 
(i.e. e has begun to occur at t), or 3) e is presently occurring at t by straddling t (i.e. e has 
some temporal parts that are earlier than t, and some that are later than t).  Given the ontology 
of the growing universe theory, however, 2) is clearly not an option, since no event exists 
later than the present moment t.  1) clearly is an option, since the growing universe theory 
affirms the existence of past events.  What, then, should we make of 3)?   If e has temporal 
parts that are later than t, then those parts are future, and are therefore—on the growing 
universe theory—non-existent.  The result of endorsing 3) is thus to endorse the view that 
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non-instantaneous events have non-existent (because future) temporal parts.  But should we 
allow the existence of such entities, or should we deny that reality admits of concrete events 
with non-existent temporal parts, and is rather constituted by determinate events?  If the latter 
is the correct answer, then 1) is the correct account of the relation that a non-instantaneous 
event e, occurring at the present moment t, bears to t; and thus e is not a present event at all, 
but a past one.  Furthermore, this conclusion, if true, generalizes for all non-instantaneous 
events; since, if no such events ever bear the relations specified in 2) or 3), then no such 
events are future or present, and thus all such events are past.   
Henceforth, I will interpret the conclusion that all non-instantaneous events are past as 
implying that all events, whatsoever, are past.  I offer three reasons for accepting this 
implication.  First, I take it that events are fundamentally changes, and changes require some 
non-zero duration (they take time).  Second, in ordinary language when we refer to ‘present 
events,’ we do not intend to refer to instantaneous events, and thus qualifying the claim that 
there are no present events by saying that there are no non-instantaneous present events 
would hardly assuage those who thought there were present events.  Third, it is not at all clear 
what work instantaneous events, on their own, can do in a philosophically satisfying theory of 
time (I take it, for example, that events with non-zero duration cannot be built up out of 
instantaneous events).  None of this, however, is to rule out the existence of present 
instantaneous states, as distinct from events.  Indeed, as will become clear in Section 2.3 
(below), these have a role to play in the present theory.
14
  
 It is important to realize that this is an ontic, not a semantic, argument.  The 
indeterminate events which the argument from ontic determinacy rejects are not so called 
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 I should note that I am happy to acknowledge instantaneous events as theoretical entities, and simply claim 
that there are no natural events that could be instantaneous.  In support of this position, Simons (2003: 377) 
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because the truth about them is indeterminate, as in the case of ‘it is indeterminate whether 
event e will end in such and such a way.’  Rather, e is indeterminate, according to the 
argument from ontic determinacy, because it is a concrete particular which has certain parts 
(namely, the future ones) which do not exist.  The point about not being able to designate or 
describe a present event served simply to highlight this ontological picture: if the future does 
not exist, then there is literally nothing to describe later than the utterance of the description.   
 It is also important not to conflate the concept of indeterminate event which I am 
rejecting here with the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy.
15
  The latter notion, if I 
understand it correctly, deals with indefinite existence; but indefinite existence is not a 
relevant concept in the current context.  This is an important point, because one might be 
tempted to interpret the non-existence of the future on the growing universe theory rather as 
indefinite existence.  The thought being that it is indefinite what will happen, but something 
will happen.  It is, however, metaphysically possible at the present time t that time come to an 
end at t + 1 (i.e. that no events occur after time t).  Given this possibility, the growing 
universe theorist cannot allow the indefinite existence of the future, but only its non-existence 
simpliciter.  Thus it is not metaphysically indeterminate whether the events described by 
option 3) exist, since they have some parts that definitely do exist, and some parts that 
definitely do not exist.  In short, my rejection of option 3), which yields the conclusion that 
all events are past, is based not on a rejection of some general notion of metaphysical 
indeterminacy, but on the peculiar notion of an indeterminate event engendered by 3). 
 If the argument from ontic determinacy is correct, and there are no such entities as 
present events on a growing universe theory of time, then this supports the earlier claim that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
points out that modern physics appears to show that no event can be registered below the minimum time span of 
10-43 seconds (the so-called Planck time).   
 23 
past existence is existence simpliciter.  Events are determinate and complete entities which 
have fully occurred, and thus the only events that exist simpliciter are past events.  Since I 
reject the notion of an indeterminate event, and since so called ‘present’ events are 
indeterminate on the growing universe theory, I deny the existence of ‘present’ events.   
All of this is not to claim, however, (as the presentist does about the past) that the 
present is unreal.  The present does not designate a temporal region at all; rather, it is the ever 
shifting boundary between what is real (the past) and what is unreal (the future).  Consider 
the spatial analogy of a border between spatial regions.  The border is not a spatial region 
itself, it does not contain objects; rather, it carves up the spatial regions which themselves 
contain objects.  Similarly, the present is the temporal border between past and future.  Of 
course, this analogy is not a strict one, since time on the present view is dynamic, whereas 
space is static.  So in the temporal case we would have to think of the boundary of the present 
as always ‘moving,’ and of the future ‘region’ as not containing anything at all.  Perhaps a 
stricter analogy (though with a less familiar analogue) would be a one dimensional analogy: 
if time is like a line growing in length from one end, then the present is like the point located 
at the growing end of the line.  On this account, then, the fundamental mode of temporal 
existence is captured not by ‘is’ or ‘is becoming’, but by ‘has become’ or ‘has occurred’ (as 
reflected in GUE’, above).  Henceforth, I will refer to this version of the growing universe 
theory as ‘pastism.’   
2.3 Counter-intuitive? 
Now to address the incredulous stares.  One intuitive worry that threatens to derail pastism 
from the outset concerns the status of statements which purport to refer to present events; 
since the view has the consequence that, technically speaking, there are no truthmakers for 
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 See, for example, Barnes and Williams (2011), Barnes (2010), and, with specific respect to temporal 
metaphysical indeterminacy, Cameron and Barnes (2009). 
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such statements.  But this concern is easily dealt with by claiming that present tensed 
statements are really about events that have only just occurred—that is, events that are 
complete at the moment that the statement has been uttered.  And there are truthmakers for 
these events, since they are past.  So pastism does not entail that the events that we normally 
call present are, as it turns out, non-existent.  Rather, it entails that such events are not, as it 
turns out, present—they are past.   
 It will be helpful here to consider a couple of examples.  First, take the event of my 
typing this sentence: this event exists, it is just that the referent of that existential claim is an 
entity that does not have as one of its constituents the typing of a full stop.  (If I were to refer 
to the same event now, of course, it would!).  So the truthmaker for the existential claim that 
occurs half way through the previous sentence is an event that only includes the typing of half 
of a sentence, and that event became past at the moment the reference was made.  As another 
example, consider the statement ‘The Obama presidency has helped improve the world’s 
opinion of the United States,’ as uttered at 1600 BST on 4 June 2012.  This statement 
purports to be about the present event of the Obama presidency, but I deny that there is such 
an entity, so how can the statement be true (assuming that it is)?  Again, it is not that the 
Obama presidency is non-existent; rather, the event referred to in the statement above exists, 
but it is an event that ceased to occur at the time the statement was uttered.  Of course, this 
means that if one were to utter the statement one minute later at 1601, the truthmaker for that 
statement would be a different event.  But this is a direct consequence of the dynamic nature 
of time according to the growing universe theory: the sum total of existence is continuously 
increasing, which means new events are coming into existence with every passing moment of 
time.  Now, when the Obama presidency has come to an end, the truthmaker for true claims 
made about it will just be the one event spanning eight years; but in addition to the existence 
of that one event, a future commentator will also be able to quantify over every stage of the 
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presidency, each of which is also an event.  And it is these past entities that serve as 
truthmakers for present tensed claims made during the presidency.  
 Another intuitive worry that pastism gives rise to has to do with the so called 
‘privileged present,’ and the significance of present experience.  The thought is that present 
experience, in virtue of its directness, matters more to us than remembered past experiences.  
I can imagine that presentists, in particular, will be bristling with indignation at this point in 
my presentation of pastism: ‘At least the B-Theorists acknowledge the subjective significance 
of present experience.  You are either denying it, or relegating it to the same significance as 
long past experiences!’  Fortunately, this allegation is only half true.  The truth contained in it 
is that, on the pastist view, the experience which came into existence only a moment ago has 
precisely the same objective reality as a long past experience.  Indeed, inasmuch as all events 
are past, they are all equally real.  The reason that the presentist finds this view so unpalatable 
is because the A-Theory is supposed to be a common sense theory, and common sense tells 
us that there is something special about the present—and, in particular, about present 
experience.
16
  For my part, I do not deny the importance of the ‘privileged present,’ but my 
claim is that present experience is at the present, not in it (again, think of the border and point 
analogies).  The closer an experience is to the present, the more vivid it is psychologically, 
and thus the more real it is to the subject.   
 This explains how the allegation above is not accurate: I am not denying the 
subjective significance of present experience, I am merely redefining it and accounting for it 
on the basis of a different ontology than does the presentist.  Present experience, on the 
pastist view, is experience that is immediately adjacent to the present, where the present is 
conceived as the boundary between past and future (i.e. between existence and non-
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the growing universe theory. 
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existence).  Furthermore, this ontological picture objectively grounds the subjective 
significance of present experience, where the B-Theorist’s ontology does not; since the 
pastist ontology, unlike the B-Theoretic one, acknowledges the objectivity of the present.  
Nonetheless, the pastist view does call for an explanation, similar to that of the B-Theorist’s, 
in accounting for some of our other pre-theoretic beliefs about the present.  This is because 
we pre-theoretically believe not only that present experience is privileged, but also that there 
are present events.  The pastist explanation for this belief, I suggest, is best offered in terms 
of the continuity of experience.   
On the pastist view, if we think of experiences as events, then all experience is past, 
since all events are past; but I think that the view can also accommodate states of conscious 
awareness, where these states are not temporally extended entities, and can therefore be 
conceived as simultaneous with the boundary (or point) of the present.  Thus, the subject of 
experience can be in a ‘present’ state of conscious awareness, but the objects of this 
awareness are experiences that are temporally extended, and which are therefore past (given 
the argument from ontic determinacy).  What this means is that the temporally extended 
objects of our conscious awareness are all memories, even though the state of being aware of 
them is simultaneous with the present.  Now, past experiences that are adjacent to the present 
constitute such immediate memories, and are so seamlessly joined in our consciousness to 
subsequent, more immediate memories, that we subjectively locate some indefinite set of the 
most immediate memories in the specious present.  This, I suggest, is the ground of the 
common sense conception of the privileged present.  So the pastist must acknowledge that at 
least some of our beliefs about the present are based merely in subjective experience, and not 
in objective reality; but this acknowledgment does nothing to diminish the objective 
underpinnings of that subjective experience. 
2.4 Pastism and Thisness 
 27 
We are now in position to consider the role of thisness in pastism, and how we should 
conceive of the relationship between events and their thisnesses.  In Section 2.1 I concluded 
that an event e exists simpliciter in virtue of its having occurred at some past time t.  So even 
though e’s existence ontologically depends upon its having occurred, it’s existence does not 
depend upon its continuing to occur.  How is this possible?  Given TTT’ from Section 2.1, 
the natural move is to attempt to capture the existence simpliciter of e in terms of e’s thisness 
e*; but it is not immediately clear what terms the relationship between e and e* should take.  
Earlier in Section 1 I characterized the relationship in terms of manifestation: the existence of 
e is manifested in the existence of e*.  This is not very helpful, however, since it fails to tell 
us what it is for a thisness to manifest the existence of its past individual.  Is it just for the 
past individual to exist as its thisness?  ‘Existing as’ does not seem any more helpful in this 
regard than ‘manifested by.’  Furthermore, if an event e only exists simpliciter when it has 
fully occurred (as per the argument from ontic determinacy), and then exists as its thisness 
e*, what is the entity that occurred at t?  Is it just e*—can thisnesses ‘occur’; or is it some 
entity e distinct from e*?  If the latter, then how can the existence of e be captured by e*?  In 
short, what is the ontological relationship between e and e* at time t, and how does that 
relationship allow us to claim after t that e exists in virtue of e*’s existence?  
 The most straightforward way to deal with these perplexities is simply to claim that e 
is, indeed, identical to e*.  Again, consider the structural similarity between GUE’ and TTT’: 
  (GUE’)  An event e exists simpliciter just in case e has occurred at t. 
  (TTT’): The thisness e* of an event e exists simpliciter just in case e has 
occurred at t.  
Both e and e* share the same existence conditions, and so we should claim that they are 
identical.  This is all well and good, but what we now require is an explanation of how an 
event can be identical to its thisness.  Here we need not only an account of how a thisness 
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instantiates its individual, but also an account of the nature of events, such that an event could 
both instantiate its thisness and be identical to its thisness.  I develop such accounts in my 
(2013) and (manuscript), but I can only provide a brief sketch of the accounts here.  The 
sketch will, however, suffice to make conceptual room for the intended ontology of thisness 
and events.   
 Thisnesses are abstract properties in that they can exist without the individuals that 
instantiate them; but they are not universals, since, necessarily, they can only be instantiated 
uniquely.  In that, they are like tropes, except that they are not accidental properties as are 
tropes (that is, thisnesses are both unique and essential to their bearers).  Now, there is a non-
nominalistic view of tropes that takes them to be concrete instantiations of abstract 
universals.  On this view, for example, the blueness of my shirt is a unique, concrete 
instantiation of the abstract blue universal.
17
  My suggestion is that we model thisness on this 
universal/trope instantiation structure, whereby an individual x, coming into existence at t, 
concretely instantiates a thisness trope; but where the thisness trope is an instantiation of an 
abstract property—the thisness property—which exists simpliciter from t, even though the 
individual x ceases to exist at some time t + n.  Of course, given that thisnesses are not 
exactly like either universals or tropes, we would have to think of these aspects of thisness as 
quasi universals and tropes.  This model is particularly apt in the case of events, since what 
we require is both a concrete entity that has occurred in time (event e), and an abstract entity 
that exists simpliciter after e has occurred (e’s thisness e*).  But if we are going to claim that 
e = e*, then we require something more.   
 How can an event just be identical to its thisness?  Well, given that there are plausible 
trope theories of events extant, there is scope to claim that the event e which has occurred at t 
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just is a concrete, trope-like instantiation of the abstract, thisness property e*.
18
  The thought 
here is that we characterize an event’s having occurred in terms of a thisness property having 
been instantiated by its thisness trope—perhaps in a spatio-temporal region.  We have to bear 
in mind that a ‘thisness trope’ is not what is standardly called a trope; i.e. it is neither 
accidental nor qualitative.  Still, inasmuch as the thisness trope is a necessarily unique, 
concrete entity which is instantiated in space and time, it is trope-like.  The thisness trope is, 
in turn, an instantiation of the abstract thisness property; and it is the latter which exists 
simpliciter.
19
   
So, on this account, the occurrence of an event is the instantiation of an event thisness 
property by its thisness trope. Since, according to pastism, all events have occurred and exist 
simpliciter, all event thisness properties have been instantiated by their thisness tropes and 
exist simpliciter.  Further, although thisness properties exist simpliciter and tenselessly, they 
have come into existence in virtue of their thisness tropes having been instantiated at past 
times.  And there is no incoherence in tenseless existence as of a time, as long as the 
ontological distinction between an abstract thisness property and its concrete trope-like 
instantiation is kept in view.  The Incoherence objection resulted from claiming (or implying) 
that one and the same event both tenselessly exists at a past time t and has occurred at t.  
Given the present distinction between an event’s occurrence (i.e. the instantiation of a 
thisness property by its thisness trope) and its existence (i.e. the existence of the abstract 
thisness property), however, the growing universe theorist can claim that events come into 
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 One might think that this revisionist account of events is inconsistent with my claim in Section 1 that events 
are fundamental entities.  Given, however, that thisnesses are individuating principles, and not qualitative 
properties, I do not take my account of events in terms of the instantiation of event thisnesses to be a reductive 
one.  See Diekemper (2013). 
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existence in virtue of their having occurred as of a time t, but then exist simpliciter and 
tenselessly.
20
    
Conclusion 
To sum up, the point of this paper has been to present a defence of the growing universe 
theory of time against the Incoherence objection; first, by presenting a dynamic theory that 
provides a coherent account of past existence, and then by working through some of the 
ramifications of that theory.  One of these ramifications is the rather surprising thesis that 
present events do not exist.  We saw, however, that we were able to objectively account for 
our common sense beliefs about the present, with minimal damage to our other deeply held 
intuitions about time.  Indeed, if anything is clear and certain to philosophers of time, it is that 
something has ‘got to go’ in the formulation of a precise theory of time.  There is no theory of 
time that does not call for some revision of our commonly accepted terminology and beliefs, 
and this is why grasping the nature of time is so difficult.  The B-Theorist must revise our 
common sense concept of change; the presentist must reject our common sense concept of 
past existence; and—if my arguments are sound—the growing universe theorist must revise 
our common sense concept of the present.   
 The latter of these seems to me by far the least of three evils—especially given that 
there is a common sense story that underlies the esoteric metaphysical conclusions associated 
with pastism.  That story goes something like this: Time passes in virtue of events occurring 
(i.e. coming into existence), but there are no events that have not occurred, and when an event 
has occurred, then there is something that it is to have been that event.  That is the common 
                                                          
20
 Do my amendments to Adams’ theory require me to embrace ECC (see Section 1.3.2, above)?  Trivially, yes, 
though it is important to see that Adams had to deny ECC only because he claimed that e exists at t (where t is a 
past time).  Since I am claiming that e exists simpliciter, I do not have to deny ECC in order to affirm the 
existence simpliciter of e* (the existence of e* just is the existence of e). 
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sense story that pastism and its ontology rests upon; and it is one, on my view, that justifies 




Adams, R.M., ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’, The Journal of Philosophy 76(1) 
(1979): 5-26 
 
Adams. R.M., ‘Actualism and Thisness’, Synthese 57 (1981): 3-42 
 
Adams, R.M., ‘Time and Thisness’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1986): 315-29 
 
Armstrong, D.M., ‘Universals as Attributes’ in Kim, J. and Sosa, E. (eds.) Metaphysics: An 
Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell (1999): 198-208 
 
Barnes, E., ‘Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed’, Noûs 44(4) (2010): 601-627 
 
Barnes, E. and Cameron, R., ‘The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism, and Ontology’, 
Philosophical Studies 146:2 (2009): 291 - 309 
 
Barnes, E. and Williams, JRG, ‘A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy’, Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics 6 (2011): 103-148 
 
Bennett, J., Events and their Names, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1988) 
 
Cleland, C., ‘On the Individuation of Events’, Synthese 86 (1991): 229-54 
 
Diekemper, J., ‘Presentism and Ontological Symmetry’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
83(2): 223-40 (2005)  
 
Diekemper, J., ‘Thisness and Events’, The Journal of Philosophy CVI(5): 255-76 (2009)  
 
Diekemper, J., ‘The Ontology of Thisness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2013) doi: 
10.1111/phpr.12010  
 
Diekemper, J., Events: Temporal and Eternal (manuscript) 
 
Fine, K., “The Reality of Tense,” Synthese 150:3 (2006): 399–414 
 
Keller, S., ‘Presentism and Truthmaking’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (2004): 83-104 
 
Lowe, E.J., The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, 
Oxford: OUP (2006) 
 
McTaggart, J.M.E., ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind 17 (1908): 457-74 
 
Merricks, T., ‘Goodbye Growing Block’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2 (2006): 103-110 
 32 
 
Simons, P., ‘Events’ in Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Metaphysics, Oxford: OUP (2003): 357-385 
 
Tooley, M., Time, Tense, and Causation, Oxford: OUP (1997) 
 
van Inwagen, P., ‘Changing the Past’ in Zimmerman, D. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 
5 (2010): 3-28 
 
Zimmerman, D., ‘The Privileged Present: Defending an “A-Theory” of Time’ in Sider, T., 
Hawthorne, J. and Zimmerman, D. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, Malden, 
MA: Blackwell (2008): 211-225 
 
